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Robert P. Mosteller & Kenneth S. Broun†† 
Paul Giannelli’s Scholarship of 
Measured Wisdom, Sophistication, 
and Significance, and a Man of 
Diligence, Humor, and 
Graciousness 
We had the great fortune to have Paul Giannelli join our evidence 
casebook more than fifteen years ago upon the retirement of our co-
author Professor John Strong. Some years later, Paul also became a co-
author of our evidence problem book. In this piece, we make comments, 
first regarding Paul as an exceptional evidence scholar as reflected in 
his contribution to our evidence casebook, and second regarding Paul 
as a wonderful co-author and colleague. 
I. Paul Giannelli—Exceptional Evidence Scholar 
Paul brought rich insights and detailed knowledge of evidence law 
across a broad range of topics to our casebook1 and contributed in many 
different ways. As the lead author of the comprehensive, frequently-
cited text, Scientific Evidence,2 he was in a unique position to make an 
especially strong contribution to our book in the area of expert 
testimony and related matters. This Article gives us an opportunity to 
stress his enormous impact on the development of the law of expert 
evidence and particularly his analysis of Daubert v. Merrell Dow 
Pharmaceuticals, Inc.3 
 
††  J. Dickson Phillips Distinguished Professor of Law at the University of North 
Carolina School of Law; Henry Brandis Professor of Law Emeritus at the 
University of North Carolina School of Law. 
1. Kenneth S. Broun, Robert P. Mosteller & Paul C. Giannelli, 
Evidence: Cases and Materials (8th ed. 2014). 
2. Paul C. Giannelli et al., Scientific Evidence (5th ed. 2012). 
3. 509 U.S. 579 (1993). 
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Paul brought an impressive measure of sophistication, careful dis-
tinctions, and depth of knowledge to this discussion. His analysis of the 
impact of Daubert and Kumho Tire4 on the treatment of expert evidence 
admissibility presented in one short note describing the impact of 
Daubert and its progeny on the development of the law in the states is 
particularly insightful.5 In the note, he briefly set out six different and 
significant observations:6 (1) He recognized the complexity of the effects 
of the Daubert case, noting that some states adopted Daubert, but not 
the other two cases in the trilogy;7 (2) Paul observed that features of 
Daubert have crept into the analysis in states that have continued to 
use the Frye test;8 (3) he found that after Daubert was decided, Frye—
which had generally been limited to criminal cases—was extended to 
civil torts cases; (4) he noted that Daubert’s greatest impact was on 
states that formerly used the relevancy approach, although the impact 
is often denied by the jurisdiction, claiming consistency in approach 
before and after substantial changes; (5) he observed that while some 
states adopted a Daubert-like system, having rejected Frye before 
Daubert was decided, they use a decidedly different set of tests; (6) 
finally, Paul questioned the significance of the jurisdiction’s choice be-
tween using a Daubert- or Frye-based approach to the admission of ex-
pert evidence. He described an existing difference in Frye states 
between those that were strict and those that were lax in their scrutiny 
of the admission of expert testimony. He observed that the most signifi-
cant difference between the approaches in different jurisdictions is not 
based on the choice between Daubert or Frye-based systems, but be-
tween strict or lax scrutiny.9 
Elsewhere, Paul dealt with which system—Daubert or Frye—
provides “the better approach.” His response, based on the insight of 
the Washington Supreme Court, is that the difficulties of applying Frye 
in some contexts is often related to the complexity of the issue and that 
truly complex and controversial evidence is going to be difficult under 
either standard.10 
He drew the distinction between the impact of Daubert in civil 
cases, where evidence has been examined more closely and more evi-
dence has been found unreliable,  as contrasted to the treatment of 
 
4. Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137 (1999). 
5. Broun, Mosteller & Giannelli, supra note 1, at 650–51. 
6. Id.  
7. The trilogy includes Daubert, Kumho Tire, and General Electric Co. v. 
Joiner, 522 U.S. 136 (1997). 
8. Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923). 
9. Broun, Mosteller & Giannelli,  supra note 1, at 650–51.  
10. Id. at 637. 
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criminal cases where admissibility standards have remained largely 
unchanged.11 
Finally, he chose Judge Nancy Gertner’s decision in United States 
v. Hines12 as one of the principal cases in the chapter.13 Among other 
insights from this case is the appropriately different treatment of relia-
bility for different issues that themselves differ in complexity. Judge 
Gertner found the validity of handwriting analysis insufficiently estab-
lished to allow the expert to give an opinion that the defendant was the 
writer of the “stickup” note in a robbery case, but adequately validated 
to provide guidance to the jury in reaching its own decision as to 
whether the defendant was the author of that note. Paul clearly recog-
nized that Judge Gertner’s limitation on giving an opinion of authorship 
did not represent the majority position in the federal courts.14 Never-
theless, the insight that when an expert exercises a teaching function, 
providing information to jurors to aid their evaluation of the evidence, 
as authorized by the “or otherwise” language in Rule 702,15 validity 
under Daubert must be shown, but the extent of the validity showing 
is not necessarily as extensive.16 
All of these insights are, in our judgment, both cogent and well 
framed. Paul compressed an extraordinary quantity of information and 
insights into a very compact space and presented it in a coherent way 
that was very accessible to teachers and students alike. 
As evidence teachers who live in North Carolina and each have an 
evidence treatise for practitioners in the state,17 we found these points 
particularly insightful as our state courts wrestled with the impact of 
the Daubert decision on North Carolina’s treatment of expert testi-
mony. We believe that the development of the law regarding expert 
testimony dealing with the reliability of expert testimony in our state 
strongly supports and illustrates the points Paul makes in our casebook. 
The importance of the state court’s analysis depends more upon 
 
11. Id. at 648–49. 
12. 55 F. Supp. 2d 62 (D. Mass. 1999). 
13. Broun, Mosteller & Giannelli, supra note 1, at 651–58. 
14. Id. at 658. 
15. See Fed. R. Evid. 702 advisory committee’s note to 2000 amendment.  
16. See D. Michael Risinger, Preliminary Thoughts on a Functional Taxonomy 
of Expertise for the Post-Kumho World, 31 Seton Hall L. Rev. 508, 533–
37 (2000) (arguing for different threshold standards for different kinds of 
expert evidence). 
17. Kenneth S. Broun, Brandis & Broun on North Carolina Evidence 
(7th ed. 2017); Robert P. Mosteller et al., North Carolina 
Evidentiary Foundations (3d ed. 2016). 
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whether the court takes a strict or a lax approach to the analysis of 
expert testimony than whether the state labels itself a Daubert, Frye, 
or something-else jurisdiction. 
North Carolina Was a Pre-Daubert Reliability State with a Very 
Different Set of Tests 
Beginning in 1984 with its decision in State v. Bullard18 and 
continuing the development with State v. Pennington19 in 1990, North 
Carolina rejected exclusive adherence to Frye. It also developed its own 
separate reliability test for admissibility of expert testimony as Daubert 
later did in the federal courts.20 
A Period of Uncertainty Whether North Carolina Became a “Daubert 
State” Through Judicial Analysis 
Whether North Carolina had in fact become a “Daubert state” 
became a matter of uncertainty and debate in 1995 when State v. 
Goode,21 cited Daubert with apparent approval.22 The North Carolina 
Court of Appeals read this citation to mean that North Carolina had 
 
18. 322 S.E.2d 370, 381–82 nn.14–15 (N.C. 1984). 
19. 393 S.E.2d 847, 852–53 (N.C. 1990). 
20. In State v. Pennington, the North Carolina Supreme Court stated: 
A new scientific method of proof is admissible at trial if the method 
is sufficiently reliable. Reliability of a scientific procedure is usually 
established by expert testimony, and the acceptance of experts 
within the field is one index, though not the exclusive index, of 
reliability. Thus we do not adhere exclusively to the formula, 
enunciated in Frye v. United States, and followed in many 
jurisdictions, that the method of proof “must be sufficiently 
established to have gained general acceptance in the particular field 
in which it belongs.” Believing that the inquiry underlying the Frye 
formula is one of the reliability of the scientific method rather than 
its popularity within a scientific community, we have focused on the 
following indices of reliability: the expert’s use of established 
techniques, the expert’s professional background in the field, the use 
of visual aids before the jury so that the jury is not asked “to sacrifice 
its independence by accepting [the] scientific hypotheses on faith,” 
and independent research conducted by the expert.  
 Id. (citations omitted). 
21. 461 S.E.2d 631 (N.C. 1995). 
22. Id. at 639. The court stated “[a]s recognized by the United States Supreme 
Court in its most recent opinion addressing the admissibility of expert 
scientific testimony, this requires a preliminary assessment of whether the 
reasoning or methodology underlying the testimony is sufficiently valid and 
whether that reasoning or methodology can be properly applied to the facts 
in issue.” Id. (citing Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579 
(1993)). 
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in some form adopted Daubert as its test,23 and it applied the Daubert 
analysis in Howerton v. Arai Helmet, Ltd.24 
A Clear Rejection of Adoption of Daubert as the Method for Judging 
Expert Admissibility by the North Carolina Supreme Court and a Choice 
of “Lax” Application 
In its opinion reversing the lower court’s Howerton decision, the 
North Carolina Supreme Court left no room for uncertainty. It clearly 
rejected the Court of Appeals’ conclusion, stating that “North Carolina 
is not, nor has it ever been, a Daubert jurisdiction.”25 
Paul has noted that a critical distinction between jurisdictions that 
is generally more significant than whether the Frye test or the Daubert 
test was employed was whether the jurisdiction was strict or lax in its 
application of the test. The North Carolina Supreme Court judged the 
dominant Daubert test to be too strict and clearly chose the merits of 
scrutiny that was more flexible. The court used the quoted language 
below to describe its negative view of what it saw as an overly rigid 
and excessively exacting Daubert system and its negative impact on the 
right to a jury trial in contrast to what it perceived to be a more flexible 
North Carolina reliability-based system. 
While North Carolina cases “share obvious similarities with the 
principles underlying Daubert, application of the North Carolina ap-
proach is decidedly less mechanistic and rigorous than the ‘exacting 
standards of reliability’ demanded by the federal approach.”26 The court 
stated: 
We believe that in practice, however, application of the “flexible” 
Daubert standard has been anything but liberal or relaxed and 
that trial courts, such as the one in the present case, have often 
been reluctant to stray far from the original Daubert factors in 
their analysis of the reliability of expert testimony. . . . As a 
consequence of these stringent threshold standards for admitting 
expert testimony, we are concerned with the case-dispositive 
nature of Daubert proceedings, whereby parties in civil actions 
may use pre-trial motions to exclude expert testimony under 
 
23. State v. Bates, 538 S.E.2d 597, 600 (N.C. Ct. App. 2000) (stating that Goode 
had adopted Daubert). 
24. 581 S.E.2d 816, 826 (N.C. Ct. App. 2003) (“From a thorough review of our 
case law, it is eminently clear that North Carolina has adopted the Daubert 
analysis.”). 
25. Howerton v. Arai Helmet, Ltd., 597 S.E.2d 674, 693 (N.C. 2004). 
26. Id. at 690 (citing Weisgram v. Marley Co., 528 U.S. 440, 455 (2000)). 
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Daubert to bootstrap motions for summary judgment that 
otherwise would not likely succeed.27 
When evidence is excluded in pre-trial hearings, the court stated 
“we are concerned that trial courts asserting sweeping pre-trial ‘gate-
keeping’ authority under Daubert may unnecessarily encroach upon the 
constitutionally-mandated function of the jury to decide issues of fact 
and to assess the weight of the evidence.”28 And in summary, the North 
Carolina Supreme Court stated: 
Although our criticism of Daubert is largely anecdotal and by no 
means exhaustive, given the serious implications of these 
concerns, we believe that on balance the North Carolina law 
which has coalesced in Goode establishes a more workable 
framework for ruling on the admissibility of expert testimony 
under North Carolina Rule of Evidence 702. Long before Daubert 
was decided, North Carolina had in place a flexible system of 
assessing the foundational reliability of expert testimony, the 
practicability of which is evidenced by the case law. Within this 
system, our trial courts are already vested with broad discretion 
to limit the admissibility of expert testimony as necessitated by 
the demands of each case. Requiring a more complicated and 
demanding rule of law is unnecessary to assist North Carolina 
trial courts in a procedure which we do not perceive as in need of 
repair. We therefore expressly reject the federal Daubert standard 
upon which both the trial court and the Court of Appeals 
erroneously based their respective rulings.29 
Adoption of Daubert Analysis for North Carolina by Legislative Action 
In 2011, as part of a group of “Tort Reform” changes in the law, 
the North Carolina legislature amended North Carolina Rule 702(a) to 
follow the wording of Federal Rule 702 after it was amended in 2000.30 
Previously this part of the North Carolina statute had tracked the 
wording of the original version of Federal Rule 702, with one exception. 
Federal Rule 702 provided that the witness may testify in the form of 
an opinion “or otherwise.” The North Carolina rule as initially 
 
27. Id. at 691. 
28. Id. at 692 (citing N.C. Const. art. I, § 25; Brasher v. Sandoz Pharm., 160 F. 
Supp. 2d 1291, 1295 (N.D. Ala. 2001); Logerquist v. McVey, 1 P.3d 113, 131 
(Ariz. 2000); Bunting v. Jamieson, 984 P.2d 467, 472 (Wyo. 1999)). 
29. Id. at 692–93. 
30. An Act to Provide Tort Reform for North Carolina Citizens and Businesses, 
H.B. 542, 2011 Gen. Assemb. § 1.3 (N.C. 2011). 
Case Western Reserve Law Review·Volume 68·Issue 3·2018 
Tribute to Professor Paul Giannelli 
811 
promulgated eliminated “or otherwise.”31 Because the change in the 
state’s rule was made effective only prospectively,32 it was not until 
2016 that the North Carolina Supreme Court interpreted the effect of 
the amendment. It did so in State v. McGrady,33 a criminal case in 
which the testimony of a use-of-force expert offered by the defense had 
been excluded on the basis of Daubert analysis.34 
In McGrady, the North Carolina Supreme Court explained the 
changes resulting from the 2011 amendment. Reversing the court’s 
statement in Howerton, it declared that “North Carolina is now a 
Daubert state.”35 
In our casebook, Paul noted differences in the rigor in which the 
Daubert standards have been applied among states that have “adopted” 
Daubert.36 In McGrady, the court attempted to set out how the federal 
rule, advisory committee commentary, and case law was to be applied 
in North Carolina. The federal rule codified the full breath of the 
Daubert standard.37 “By adopting virtually the same language from the 
federal rule into the North Carolina rule, the General Assembly thus 
adopted the meaning of the federal rule as well.”38 The adopted 
“Daubert standard” also includes existing North Carolina precedents, 
as long as those precedents do not conflict with the amended rule’s text 
or those three United States Supreme Court decisions, but would not 
include subsequent federal developments.39 
The Major Change: The New Standard Is More Rigorous 
While the 2011 amendment did not change the basic structure of 
the inquiry under the previous North Carolina rule or displace relevant 
tests of reliability under Howerton, the amendment had a significant 
impact on the “lax” standards for admission of expert evidence. It 
changed “the level of rigor that [North Carolina] courts must use to 
 
31. See Mosteller et al., supra note 17, at app. 1 at art. 7 (setting out official 
commentary by the drafters to the original North Carolina rule). 
32. H.B. 542, § 4.2 (making the provisions of the amended evidence rule effective 
to actions commenced after October 1, 2011). 
33. 787 S.E.2d 1 (N.C. 2016). 
34. Id. at 5. 
35. Id. at 8. 
36. Broun, Mosteller & Giannelli, supra note 1, at 651. 
37. McGrady, 787 S.E.2d at 6. 
38. Id. at 7–8. 
39. Id. at 8. The court also endorsed the additional tests for admissibility of 
expert testimony provided in the advisory committee note to the 2000 
amendment of Federal Rule 702. Id. at 10. 
Case Western Reserve Law Review·Volume 68·Issue 3·2018 
Tribute to Professor Paul Giannelli 
812 
scrutinize expert testimony before admitting it.”40 Whereas Howerton 
was “decidedly less . . . rigorous” than Daubert,41 the federal standard 
established, in the words of Weisgram v. Marley,42 “exacting standards 
of reliability.”43 
The Exclusion of the Expert Testimony in the McGrady Case Itself 
Charles McGrady was charged with the first-degree murder of his 
cousin and neighbor James Shore. McGrady claimed that the killing 
was in self-defense. According to McGrady’s testimony, following a ver-
bal altercation, Shore grabbed an AR-15 assault rifle from the golf cart 
in which McGrady and his son were riding and pointed it at McGrady’s 
son’s head.44 McGrady pulled a Beretta pistol from his pocket, and, in 
1.82 seconds45 fired seven times at Shore. He hit Shore “four or five 
times in the front and side and twice in the back.”46 The shots to the 
back were obviously problematic for McGrady’s self-defense claim, par-
ticularly since one of those shots to the back was the fatal shot that 
went through Shore’s lung and into his heart.47 
The testimony excluded in McGrady was that of Dave F. Cloutier, 
a use-of-force expert who the defense proposed to call as a witness. This 
expert sought to testify about average reaction times for study subjects 
to turn their bodies—turning 90 degrees in an average of 0.31 seconds 
and turning 180 degrees in an average time of 0.676 seconds.48 He also 
reported an average of 0.365 seconds for study subjects to shoot with 
their finger already on the trigger and 0.677 seconds with the finger 
outside the trigger guard.49 Cloutier cited a single study for the specific 
 
40. Id. 
41. Id. (quoting Howerton v. Arai Helmet, Ltd., 597 S.E.2d 674, 690 (N.C. 2004). 
42. 528 U.S. 440 (2000). 
43. McGrady, 787 S.E.2d at 7 (quoting Weisgram, 528 U.S. at 455). 
44. Id. at 4–5. 
45. Id. at 13. McGrady recorded the audio of the incident on a tape recorder, id. 
at 4, which is the apparent source of the precise timing of the seven shots. 
46. Id. at 5. The uncertainty in the number of shots that hit Shore resulted from 
the fact that some of the bullets entered the decedent’s arm and then 
reentered his torso, making it difficult to calculate an exact number of shots. 
State v. McGrady, 753 S.E.2d 361, 364 (N.C. Ct. App. 2014). 
47. McGrady, 753 S.E.2d at 364. 
48. Defendant’s Expert Report of Dave F. Cloutier at 13, State v. McGrady, 787 
S.E.2d 1 (N.C. 2014) (Nos. 11CRS54425, COA13-330) [hereinafter Cloutier 
Report]. 
49. Id.; see also McGrady, 787 S.E.2d at 13. 
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average times given.50 However, the testimony had two distinct parts. 
The first, which described the average time it took subjects to do a 
physical act—turn their bodies—that would have application to the 
victim, Shore. The second, which deals with the firing of the gun—a 
course of action that also includes perception, thinking, and action—
that would have application to the defendant, McGrady. 
Many of the studies cited by Cloutier involved police officers with 
special training as the subjects of the study, but one regarding the speed 
with which individuals can turn their bodies instead involved college 
students, most without firearms training.51 It reported similar average 
times to those given above.52 With regard to the actions that require 
perception, thought, and reaction, he cited a Federal Aviation 
Administration study of midair collision avoidance.53 
The trial court found Cloutier’s testimony to be unreliable. The 
principal reason it cited—and the reason that the North Carolina 
Supreme Court approved—for exclusion of the testimony was that the 
defense expert had not provided the court with known or potential error 
rates for the studies on the reaction times that he used.54 Another 
ground cited was that the expert had not considered variables in his 
testimony that the expert acknowledged could have affected the 
 
50. Ernest J. Tobin & Martin L. Fackler, MD, Officer Reaction-Response Times 
in Firing a Handgun, 3 J. Int’l Wound Ballistics Ass’n 6 (1997); see 
also Voir Dire Transcript of Dave Cloutier at 1148–49, State v. McGrady, 
787 S.E.2d 1 (N.C. 2014) (Nos. 11CRS54425, COA13-330) [hereinafter Voir 
Dire Transcript]. Although this study was clearly given as the source of this 
data and a number of other studies were cited in Cloutier’s report, see 
Cloutier Report, supra note 48, at 11–13, the Supreme Court erroneously 
referred to only two studies—one by the Federal Aviation Administration 
and another done with college students, which the expert’s report indicated 
was written by William J. Lewinski. See McGrady, 787 S.E.2d at 14. 
51. Cloutier Report, supra note 48, at 12–13. 
52. That report is by Bill Lewinski, Ph.D., Why is the Suspect Shot in the Back?, 
Police Marksman, Nov.–Dec. 2000, at 20, 25–27; Cloutier Report, supra 
note 48, at 13 n.30. 
53. Civil Aeromedical Inst.–Physiological Operations, Fed. Aviation 
Admin., Physiological Training-High Speed Flight 24 (1972); see 
Cloutier Report, supra note 48, at 11–12 n.27; Voir Dire Transcript, supra 
note 50, at 1147–48, 1159 (describing a Los Angeles Police Department study 
regarding braking times to stop a vehicle once a danger was perceived). 
54. See McGrady, 787 S.E.2d at 14. The trial judge also cited the issue of peer 
review. During the trial judge’s questioning of Cloutier, he asked, “[d]id any 
doctor peer review your opinion in this case?” and received a negative answer 
from Cloutier. Voir Dire Transcript, supra note 50, at 1167. In ruling against 
admitting the expert testimony, the trial court began by stating that “Mr. 
Cloutier has not been the subject of peer review; at least nothing was brought 
forward to suggest that it has been.” Id. at 1189. 
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reactions times. The omitted variable was the defendant’s back injury 
and recognized physical disability.55 
Did the Court Get the Narrow Issue of the Inadequacy of the Expert’s 
Testimony Wrong? 
While there may well have been substantial reasons to question 
other parts of the testimony that Cloutier would have provided, we 
have serious concerns about the correctness of the rationale and ruling 
excluding one part of it—the average times of study participants to 
turn their bodies and average times for other study participants to fire 
a weapon. It is not at all clear—particularly as applied to the average 
speed with which the study participants turned their bodies—that the 
judge’s decision to exclude was correct because the defense expert failed 
to provide the court with known or potential error rates for the relevant 
studies. The secondary ground of failure to take into account the de-
fendant’s back injury and disability was closer to being correct, but 
likely also failed. As to error rate and average turning times, the criti-
cism simply does not fit the type of test results involved. “The typical 
use of the term ‘error rate’ refers to the number of ‘mistakes’ a partic-
ular technique or method will make in some specific number of trials.”56 
This testimony was not predicting a particular result, but rather re-
porting average results from observations of human capacity or 
performance. 
Moreover, the testimony about the studies was not part of an opin-
ion by the expert of what happened in the case, but rather was for the 
purpose of helping the jury assess the plausibility of McGrady’s 
testimony that the shots he fired while fearing for his and his son’s life 
as Shore threatened them could have entered Shore’s back as he turned 
away. During defense counsel’s redirect of the expert, he clarified that 
Cloutier would not be offering an opinion as to the specific time it took 
McGrady to react or Shore to react or turn around.57 The testimony re-
garding the studies was not predicting results but rather was showing 
human capacity to turn the body quickly and thereby giving the jurors 
information to assist them in judging McGrady’s testimony. The judge 
apparently missed that this was the type of limited use of expertise that 
Judge Gertner approved in United States v. Hines. Such testimony was 
useful to the jury in evaluating handwriting and valid for that limited 
use, even though it was not valid if the expert were to go an additional 
 
55. See McGrady, 787 S.E.2d at 14 (noting the trial court’s reliance on the 
expert’s failure to consider these conditions and stating that the defendant 
“had a back injury and a disability rating from the military”). 
56. 1 David L. Faigman et al., Modern Scientific Evidence: The Law 
and Science of Expert Testimony §1:21, at 77 (2015–2016 ed.). 
57. Voir Dire Transcript, supra note 50, at 1173. 
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step and render an opinion regarding the defendant’s authorship of the 
“stickup” note.58 Moreover, as Judge Gertner observed, such testimony 
is particularly useful where it informs jurors of information that con-
flicts with their prior common understanding.59 
The trial judge came much closer to a valid ground for excluding 
the average-turning-time evidence in his secondary argument that the 
expert failed to explain the impact of the defendant’s physical disability 
and his back injury on the time it might have taken him to turn his 
body. The failure to consider an important variable on performance is 
a deficiency that undercuts the reliability of the evidence in a fashion 
similar to poor results where error rates are appropriate measures of 
validity. Professors John Meixner and Shari Diamond argue that error 
rate analysis plays a bigger role, particularly in exclusion of expert testi-
mony, than scholars looking at results have generally noted.60 They 
argue that explicit numerical error rates are often not available or 
appropriate, and as result, an error rate as an explicit test for admis-
sibility appears infrequently in decided cases.61 
Professors Meixner and Diamond contend that the concept of error 
rate should be more broadly conceived. They believe it should include, 
not only “the more explicit ‘known’ error, which can be evaluated sim-
ply by assessing a numerical value,” but also “the more implicit ‘poten-
tial’ error, which can be assessed by examining the methodology and 
evaluating its potential for producing erroneous results.”62 “An implicit 
error rate analysis might be characterized as an analysis in which the 
judge is attempting to discern the likely accuracy of the expert even if 
an error rate has not been explicitly provided.”63 They note that an ex-
pert not taking account of a critical feature of the case that differs from 
the study circumstances, similar to the defendant’s back injury and dis-
ability, should be a basis for exclusion under this category of “implicit 
error rate.”64 
 
58. See supra notes 12–16 and accompanying text. 
59. See Broun, Mosteller & Giannelli, supra note 1, at 657. 
60. See John B. Meixner & Shari Seidman Diamond, The Hidden Daubert 
Factor: How Judges Use Error Rates in Assessing Scientific Evidence, 2014 
Wis. L. Rev. 1063, 1063 (2014). 
61. The trial judge asked, “[d]id any of the studies you have cited account for 
an error rate for someone that has had a back injury in the past?” Voir Dire 
Transcript, supra note 50, at 1166. 
62. Meixner & Diamond, supra note 60, at 1071. 
63. Id. at 1089. 
64. Id. at 1065–67 (describing a products liability case in which the expert’s 
observation was after a change in the condition of the vehicle from its 
condition at the time of the accident, which the authors contend should be 
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Cloutier’s suggested explanation that the effect of adrenalin would 
likely overcome the impact of a back injury or disability was insuf-
ficient.65 However, while still a technically valid criticism, the failure to 
take into account the potential effect of a disability and a back injury 
on turning times is not significant when applied to the defendant. For 
the evidence to be helpful to the defendant, his reaction time in shooting 
needs to be slow in comparison to the victim’s turning time. It is hard 
to imagine a situation where taking into account the defendant’s phys-
ical limitations would speed up his reaction time. Rather it would likely 
have slowed his reaction time. Evidence is not excluded because it could 
have been more helpful to the party offering it if other factors were con-
sidered. Indeed, the prosecutor’s first line of attack on this issue was 
Cloutier’s failure to take into account the fact that the victim had had 
a broken back and Cloutier’s failure to get access to the victim’s medical 
records so he could consider this injury.66 Had that failure been a ground 
for exclusion, the argument would have been much more powerful since 
the injury could well have slowed down the victim’s turning time, which 
would have undercut the expert’s testimony. However, the trial judge 
ignored the prosecutor’s line of questioning and argument and focused 
only on the defendant’s condition in his questioning of Cloutier and in 
his ruling excluding the testimony.67 
Another possible basis for exclusion was the failure of the expert to 
respond to the trial judge’s question regarding error rates for reaction 
times. The expert was not prepared to answer and responded that he 
did not know. However, there were valid responses that he could have 
given.68 There are some weaknesses in aspects of the research Cloutier 
 
excluded because of likely error based on improper methodology and which 
they label “implicit error rate analysis”). 
65. See State v. McGrady, 787 S.E.2d 1, 14 (N.C. 2016). 
66. Voir Dire Transcript, supra note 50, at 1163–65. In arguing for exclusion of 
Cloutier’s testimony, the prosecutor asserted that evidence had been 
presented that the victim had a broken back. Id. at 1175–76. 
67. Id. at 1165–67, 1190. 
68. Cf. McGrady, 787 S.E.2d at 14 (“A trial judge could reasonably conclude 
that Mr. Cloutier’s degree of unfamiliarity with these studies rendered his 
testimony about them, the conclusions about this particular case that he 
drew from them, unreliable.”). The trial judge had an excessively broad view 
of the usefulness of error rates to determine reliability under Daubert. He 
asked the same error rate questions, not only about reaction times, but also 
to the use of force variables, perception of pre-attack cues, perception 
narrowing, and the effects of the “fight or flight” phenomenon. See Voir Dire 
Transcript, supra note 50, at 1170–71. Cloutier’s response to every error rate 
question, including that of reaction time, was basically the same—that he 
did not know. Id. For the Lewinski study of college students used by 
Cloutier, which reported average turning times and quickest turning times 
for the twenty-five test subjects over five repetitions of each turning 
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utilized but not likely substantial enough to warrant exclusion of the 
reaction time testimony. While the McGrady case was pending in the 
North Carolina Supreme Court, the New York Times published an 
article describing exactly the type of testimony McGrady offered. But, 
the article discussed evidence presented on behalf of police officers ac-
cused in criminal and civil cases of unjustified shooting of suspects, 
often fleeing and sometimes shot in the back.69 The article describes the 
testimony of psychology professor William J. Lewinski in defense of the 
officers.70 Lewinski has enjoyed considerable success and notoriety.  
In McGrady, Cloutier relied on two of Lewinski’s articles.71 In terms 
of Daubert factors, Lewinski’s research was not published in peer 
reviewed journals, but instead in a trade publication popular with the 
police.72 It also has an element of professional bias behind it, in that it 
grows out of research tied up in litigation that the expert benefits from, 
rather than research conducted independently from litigation.73 
Variants of these two criticisms also apply to the article by Tobin and 
Fackler, upon which Cloutier’s specific reaction times are based.74 
 
procedure, the primary response should have been, as noted above, that error 
rate is inappropriate for reporting average performance times. As to the 
accuracy of the data reported, Lewinski described the mechanical recording 
and timing instruments used and stated that the “error factor in the timing 
is plus or minus 03/100ths of a second.” See Lewinski, supra note 52, at 20. 
Similarly, the Tobin and Fackler article provides information on the degree 
of precision of the timing technology, and for the turning times of the study 
participants, it reports the mean, range, and standard deviation, but nothing 
about error rate. See Tobin & Fackler, supra note 50, at 7. 
69. See Matt Apuzzo, Training Officers to Shoot First, and He Will Answer 
Questions Later, N.Y. Times (Aug. 1, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/ 
2015/08/02/us/training-officers-to-shoot-first-and-he-will-answer-questions-
later.html?_r=0 [https://perma.cc/G658-PQFA]. 
70. Id. 
71. Voir Dire Transcript, supra note 50, at 1140–41, 1161. 
72. Apuzzo, supra note 69 (noting three Lewinski articles, all of which were 
published in The Police Marksman, “a popular magazine for [police] 
officers”). 
73. See Fed. R. Evid. 702 advisory committee’s note to 2000 amendment 
(describing the first of five additional tests set out in the note). 
74. This Journal of the International Wound Ballistics Association 
article is similarly published in a trade magazine related to law 
enforcement—Public Agency Training Council. See Tobin & Fackler, 
supra note 50. Like Lewinski, Tobin and Fackler have gained notoriety as 
experts whose work benefits charged police officers. See Shot in the Back, 
Now What?, Pub. Agency Training Council, http://www.patc.com/ 
special/shotinback.shtml [https://perma.cc/A5VV-WDRW] (last visited 
Feb. 11, 2018) (listing Tobin and Fackler along with Lewinski as doing 
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Finally, as to reaction times—particularly the speed with which study 
participants could turn their bodies, where the evidence was on the 
most solid ground—there may be an argument that exclusion was 
harmless on the facts of this case. McGrady fired seven rounds over a 
period of 1.82 seconds, with two of those rounds entering Shore’s back.75 
Without expert testimony, the jury could have understood that Shore 
would have been able to do substantial turning during those 1.82 sec-
onds. How information on quickness of turning times would have aided 
the jury in evaluating the self-defense issue is arguably less clear, and, 
therefore, exclusion is arguably less significant under these facts than 
in other scenarios involving shorter time periods and fewer shots. 
It appears that the trial judge and the North Carolina Supreme 
Court misapplied the error rate argument from Daubert in the McGrady 
case. That may be considered a somewhat technical error, but the 
change in the law as interpreted by the court requires rigorous scrutiny 
of reliability. When the North Carolina Supreme Court ruled that the 
enactment of amended Rule 702 meant a rigorous enforcement of 
Daubert admissibility rules, it presumably should have embraced with 
this enhanced rigor a companion responsibility of judicial accuracy in 
application of reliability concepts. Exclusion based on a rote and mis-
applied incantation of error rates or peer review,76 particularly when 
rigorously enforced, should not be the new way that the reliability of 
expert testimony is judged in North Carolina. 
These courts also made an additional legal error in failing to 
recognize that the expert in this instance was undertaking a different 
and more limited task of educating the jurors rather than giving an 
opinion about an outcome, and the education was for the purpose of 
correcting a likely societal misconception. The Supreme Court gave no 
attention to this different purpose and, perhaps more remarkably, did 
not note that the legislative amendment that brought Daubert analysis 
to North Carolina for the first time explicitly authorized expert 
testimony to instruct the jurors on relevant concepts to assist them in 
evaluating evidence. The 2011 amendment enacted by the North 
Carolina legislature—which incorporated the language of the 2000 
federal amendment to Rule 702 that “codified” the expert testimony 
evaluation system of Daubert and its progeny—also added the words 
“or otherwise” to the rule in the language that authorized a qualified 
expert to “testify thereto in the form of an opinion, or otherwise . . . .”77 
 
ground breaking research helpful to officers charged in connection with 
shootings). 
75. See State v. McGrady, 787 S.E.2d 1, 5 (N.C. 2016). 
76. See supra note 54 and accompanying text. 
77. N.C. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 8c-702 (West 2017). 
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As noted above, North Carolina Evidence Rule 702(a) on expert testi-
mony, as originally enacted, differed from the Federal Rule 702 only in 
omitting the words “or otherwise” from the language of the federal 
rule.78 
The meaning of the omitted “or otherwise” language in the federal 
rule is explained by one paragraph of the advisory committee note to 
the original Federal Rule 702.79 The explanation relates to the effort to 
eliminate the need to use a hypothetical question to elicit an expert 
opinion. One of the ways to eliminate the need to ask the question was 
not to elicit an opinion. Instead the expert “may give a dissertation or 
exposition of scientific or other principles relevant to the case, leaving 
the trier of fact to apply them to the facts.”80 The Commentary to the 
original North Carolina Rule 702 provided no explanation for which the 
words were omitted, stating only the result. “This rule is identical to 
Fed. R. Evid. 702, except that the words ‘or otherwise’ which appear 
at the end of the federal rule after the word ‘opinion’ have been 
omitted.”81 
 
78. See supra note 31 and accompanying text. 
79. The committee’s note to Federal Rule of Evidence 702 states: 
Most of the literature assumes that experts testify only in the form 
of opinions. The assumption is logically unfounded. The rule 
accordingly recognizes that an expert on the stand may give a 
dissertation or exposition of scientific or other principles relevant to 
the case, leaving the trier of fact to apply them to the facts. Since 
much of the criticism of expert testimony has centered upon the 
hypothetical question, it seems wise to recognize that opinions are 
not indispensable and to encourage the use of expert testimony in 
non-opinion form when counsel believes the trier can itself draw the 
requisite inference. The use of opinions is not abolished by the rule, 
however. It will continue to be permissible for the experts to take 
the further step of suggesting the inference which should be drawn 
from applying the specialized knowledge to the facts. See Rules 703 
to 705.  
 Fed. R. Evid. 702 advisory committee’s note to 2000 amendment (2012). 
80. Id. 
81. N.C. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 8c-702 (West 2017). North Carolina Rule 705 
differs from Federal Rule 705 in adding a final sentence that states: “There 
shall be no requirement that expert testimony be in response to a 
hypothetical question.” Compare id., with Fed. R. Evid. 705. Perhaps 
having eliminated the need to ask a hypothetical question through another 
provision, the invitation to this alternative type of expert testimony, which 
was in part at least designed to reduce the need for hypothetical questions, 
was seen as unnecessary. 
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Exclusion of Expert Evidence in a Criminal Case 
The North Carolina experience with Daubert shows the sophisti-
cation and accuracy of Paul’s analysis of how Daubert interacted with 
state evidence practice. However, one of his observations does not seem 
to fit. He stated that the new analysis did not have very much impact 
changing admissibility practices in criminal cases.82 McGrady would 
appear to be an exception. However, perhaps at least a partial explana-
tion is that the evidence was offered by the defense and was not part 
of the class of historically accepted forensic evidence used by the pros-
ecution and apparently little affected by Daubert despite the weakness 
of some types of that evidence. It will be interesting to see how Paul 
would treat this issue in the future if the McGrady case were to find its 
way into that note with a “but see” or “but cf.” citation and its ex-
planatory parenthetical. 
II. Paul Giannelli—Wonderful Co-Author and 
Colleague 
Paul has been an absolute delight to work with as a co-author. His 
work is, as described above, masterfully crafted. He was always willing 
to take on a different assignment than was his initial preference if 
needed to complete the project. His work was always completed well in 
advance of deadlines. Those aspects of responsibility went without 
saying. 
Paul gave outstanding advice in improving the work in a number 
of ways overall. For example, when he first joined the book, he 
suggested that we provide descriptive headings globally for all our notes 
that followed the cases. It took only a couple minutes after the reaction 
“oh no, not more work” wore off for us to recognize that this was 
obviously an important improvement. 
Beyond all his other outstanding attributes, Paul is a warm and 
giving person. He has a wonderful sense of humor. His presence on our 
project, and we must assume in many others, made it far more enjoy-
able than it would have been without him as our co-author, colleague, 
and friend. 
We wish Paul all the best in his retirement. 
 
82. See Broun, Mosteller & Giannelli, supra note 1, at 648–49. 
